MARC AZDARIDIS

Advocate, Member of the Chamber of Advocates of the Republic of Armenia

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-99

 

Annotation.

The article is dedicated to the new aggravating circumstance, which is a qualitative characteristic of a number of crimes provided for by the new Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia adopted on May 5, 2021, namely, committing the act with the use of a weapon or an object or means prepared or adapted in advance to cause bodily harm. The relevance of the chosen topic is evidenced by the existence of contradictory legal practice on the issue in question, numerous cases of non-uniform application of the law, as well as the need for a comprehensive interpretation of the legislation, which is the main goal of the article. The work attempts to comprehensively interpret the legislation, paying special attention to problematic issues and ones that have caused disagreement among specialists. In particular, the following questions are raised: What are the criteria for considering whether an object or means is prepared or adapted in advance to cause bodily harm? For what purpose should the object or means be adapted or prepared for the presence of an aggravating circumstance? By whom should the object or means be adapted or prepared? Can the use of an object taken from the scene of the crime cause an aggravating circumstance? In addition, the results of the practice of applying the aforementioned aggravating circumstance were discussed.

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ANAHIT ANTONYAN

Judge of the general jurisdiction court of first instance of

Kotayk Region of the RA

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-88

 

Annotation.

This scientific article discusses the essence and subjective prerequisites of the reversal of the execution of a judicial act. In the article, the author develops the conceptual approach according to which the proceeding for the reversal of the execution of a judicial act should be classified as a differentiated form of civil proceeding and be regulated exclusively by the Code of Civil Procedure. Currently, the Code of Civil Procedure does not regulate the reversal of a judicial act’s execution. The provisions related to the reversal of the execution of a judicial act are included in the law “On Compulsory Enforcement of Judicial Acts.” The author found that, like any type of proceeding, the proceedings for the reversal of the execution of a judicial act, as a differentiated form of civil proceedings, have formal, subjective, and objective prerequisites for initiation. Subjective prerequisites are the scope of subjects that are authorized to initiate such proceedings. The author has analyzed the authority of the court to reverse the execution of a judicial act on its own initiative. In the light of the current legislative regulations and judicial practice, the article also analyzed the scope of possible persons who have the right to apply to the court to reverse the execution of a judicial act.

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HAYARPI ZARGARYAN

Judge of the Anti-Corruption Appeal Court of the RA,

Candidate of Legal Sciences

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-68

 

Annotation.

The author has studied the amendments and supplements made to the RA Law “On Mediation”, which relate, among other things, to the introduction of the institution of mandatory mediation aimed at the settlement of family disputes, as well as parallels have been drawn with the amendments made to the RA Family Code and the RA Civil Procedure Code in line with these amendments.

In the process of creating the work, both foreign literature (also available via electronic links) and domestic and international legal practice were used. The issues raised by judges in practice were also taken into consideration.

The author has resolved the legislative gaps in the introduction of mandatory mediation, presented some observations related to the extrajudicial procedure of mandatory mediation, and made proposals for legislative amendments to both the RA Family Code and the RA Civil Procedure Code.

As a result of the conducted studies and analyses, the author came to the conclusion that it is necessary to make legislative amendments to Part 2 of Article 68 of the Family Code of the Republic of Armenia, Part 1 of Article 69 of the Family Code of the Republic of Armenia, as well as to consider the grounds for returning the claim in case the procedure for resorting to mandatory mediation before applying to court in accordance with the procedure established by the RA Law “On Mediation” with disputes arising from civil, family, labor, and in cases provided for by law, other legal relationships, as well as to consider Article 127, Part 1, Point 3 of the RA Civil Procedure Code as a basis for the return of the claim, establishing a legal opportunity to correct such a defect and re-submit the claim to the court.

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KAREN TUMANYAN

Member of the Supreme judicial council

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-48

 

Annotation.

This article provides a comprehensive constitutional law analysis of the nature of the right to a favorable environment and the mechanisms for its protection. This right is examined as a systemic precondition for the realization of the rights to life, health, and dignified existence.

Through comparative analysis, the article presents anthropocentric constitutional models (France, Germany, Portugal, South Africa, India), where the environment is viewed as a condition for the realization of human rights, and ecocentric models (Ecuador, Bolivia, New Zealand), which recognize the subjective rights of nature. It is noted that while the Republic of Armenia’s constitutional law model corresponds to the anthropocentric approach, it does not include direct constitutional guarantees for intergenerational justice, climate protection, or rights of nature.

The article analyzes the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (López Ostra v. Spain, Taşkín v. Turkey, Hamer v. Belgium, Tătar v. Romania, Di Sarno v. Italy), which confirms the state’s positive obligations to prevent environmental threats and ensure a proportionate balance between economic interests and the protection of human rights. Particular emphasis is placed on the Court’s position in Taşkín, according to which economic expediency cannot justify the exploitation of natural resources that creates a real threat to human health and life.

The judicial practice of the Republic of Armenia is presented, particularly the 2011 decision of the Court of Cassation (VD/3275/05/09), which restricted the ability of civil society organizations to bring environmental cases to court by requiring the contestation of direct individual rights. It is noted that the 2010 Constitutional Court decision (SDO-906) also received ambiguous interpretation in law enforcement practice, which demonstrates the need to develop the actio popularis institute to ensure judicial protection of environmental rights in the public interest.

A preventive constitutional law approach is substantiated, according to which the state’s positive obligations should be directed not only at compensating damage, but primarily at the early prevention of environmental risks. In this context, mandatory integration of impact assessment tools is proposed: Health Impact Assessment (HIA), Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA).

As a scientific contribution, an expanded model of the objective and subjective nature of the right to a favorable environment is proposed, emphasizing the potential of subjective rights in protecting collective and public interests. It is argued that this right should be viewed not as a secondary social right, but as a systemic precondition for constitutional order and the effective realization of fundamental human rights.

The article proposes the development of the actio popularis institute, improvement of administrative proceedings, and strengthening of preventive mechanisms of state control to ensure effective protection of the public interest in environmental protection.

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ASHOT POGHOSYAN

Lawyer, PhD candidate at the University of Bonn

(Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-31

 

Annotation.

The direct application of the technical regulations of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in the legal system of the Republic of Armenia (RA) creates complex issues, the resolution of which first requires a clear distinction between international treaties and acts adopted by supranational or international bodies/organizations. Any international treaty related to the areas specified in Article 116 of the RA Constitution must be ratified by the National Assembly of the RA through the adoption of a law, which cannot be said about the technical regulations of the EAEU, as they do not constitute an international treaty.

The legal position of the RA Court of Cassation and administrative courts regarding international treaties and the EAEU technical regulations grossly violates the RA Constitution and undermines the foundations of the RA’s sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law, as it results in a legal act (technical regulation) within the RA legal system that is beyond judicial oversight.

The issue must be resolved either by verifying the constitutionality of technical regulations at the national level or by enhancing the effectiveness of judicial protection at the EAEU level, while reserving the final say for the RA Constitutional Court.

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INNA NERSEYAN

Postgraduate student of the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University

specializing in 12.00.02 “Constitutional Law;

Constitutional Judicial Process; Municipal Law,”

Lawyer at the Legal Information Center "IRTEK"

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59546/18290744-2025.10-12-24

 

Annotation.

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is one of the most important elements of a democratic society and state, which is guaranteed by the constitutions of most states. This right provides an opportunity for an individual to express his or her views, form and promote the interests of various groups, and participate in the management of state affairs. However, its implementation in practice depends largely on the effectiveness of the interaction of civil society with public authorities, including local governments.

This scientific article analyzes the legal aspect of the participation of local governments in the implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to freedom of peaceful assembly. The main attention is paid to identifying current legal problems arising in the process of interaction between municipal authorities and organizers and participants of public events. Possible areas for improving legal regulation and mechanisms for the effective implementation of this right at the local level are also suggested. Particular importance is attached to the analysis of the practice of applying the legislation on assemblies at the municipal level, including issues of coordinating the places and times of events, as well as the degree of intervention of local authorities in the implementation of this constitutional right.

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